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1. Introduction 
In the theoretical literature on government design, few variables have received more 
attention than the size of the polity. Since Plato’s famous prediction that the optimal size 
of a political unit should be 5040 free citizens, the list of thinkers concerned about state 
size would include Aristotle, Montesquieu, Rousseau, and many of the founding fathers, 
among many others. One of the fathers of modern political science, Robert Dahl, devoted 
great attention to what he called the “elemental question of what is appropriate unit for a 
democratic political system … Among the vast number of theoretically possible ways of 
dividing up the inhabitants of this globe into more or less separate political systems, … 
are there any principles that instruct us as to how one ought to bound some particular 
collection of people, in order that they may rule themselves?” (Dahl 1967: 953).2 
Economists have not neglected these issues, as they conform the core of the fiscal 
federalism literature (Oates 1972). A more recent literature, pioneered by Alesina and 
Spolaore’s work (1997, 2003), provides an elegant formal theoretical framework 
incorporating both political and economic elements in order to highlight the fundamental 
trade-off that the choice of the size of the policy inevitably faces: Large polities find it 
easier to provide more public goods, but confront the costly political problem of greater 
heterogeneity of preferences among the population.  
In spite of these contributions, we are far from reaching a consensus on whether a 
larger (smaller) size brings, ceteris paribus, better government. Some empirical analyses 
have found a negative statistical relationship between size and proxies for good 
government (Olsson and Hansson 2011, Dreyer Lassen and Serritzlew 2011), others a 
positive one (Knack 2002), and yet others no significant relationship (Knack and Azfar 
2000). Others have argued that the effect of size is conditional on the presence of other 
factors, such as the degree of openness to trade (Alesina, Spolaore and Wacziarg 1998).  
  There are many solid arguments that can be made in favour of bigger polities 
(most notably, the exploitation of economies of scale in the form of larger markets, 
cheaper provision of public goods, or better protection against external threats) as well as 
against (all of them more or less related to the difficulties associated to the presence of 
                                                 
2
 See his highly lucid presidential address to the American Political Science Association (Dahl 1963), and 
his more elaborated essay on size and democracy (Dahl and Tufte 1973). 
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heterogeneous social preferences). As a result of these enormous theoretical possibilities, 
scholars usually consider the relationship between governance and country size as 
ultimately an empirical issue whose resolution often depends on the data set chosen 
(Knack and Azfar 2000, 7; Martins 1995).  
Our contribution is twofold. First, rather than look at the general link between size 
and perceptions political outcomes, we look at the more delimited question of how size 
affects perceptions of political representation living in polities of different size. The 
second part of the empirical analysis exploits a unique survey on the perception of quality 
of the provision of public services across 116 European regions to see whether the size of 
the polity matters for perceptions of the quality of the provision of public services. For 
our purposes, the virtue of this dataset is that in enable us to compare perceptions of the 
quality of provision of public services by the public in an extremely large cross-section of 
political units, but all of them in a relatively similar and thus comparable context, the 
European Union.  
These empirical strategy enable us to put to test several hypothesis from the 
standard framework used to understand the effects of size on governance. This view 
holds that governments in large polities may benefit from being able to provide better and 
cheaper public services, but political representation should unambiguously suffers as the 
size of the polity increases. As the “distance” between the citizen and her political leaders 
is greater in large polities, discrepancies between citizens and politicians are deemed to 
increase, and the ability of the latter to monitor and keep the former politically 
accountable is reduced. However, we note that the relationship between size and 
representation is slightly more complicated than this. Using cross-country individual 
level data from over forty countries, we show that, regardless of the indicator of 
representation used, the overall perception of political representation does not seem to be 
affected by the size of the polity. However, this does not imply that size is irrelevant. 
Perhaps more interestingly, the effect of size seems to operate not on the level, but on the 
variation of these perceptions within countries. People living in large polities tend to have 
more divisive views about how representation works in the political system (some 
expressing very favourable views, some very negative), while those living in small 
polities tend to have more similar perceptions of the quality of political representation. 
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This divisiveness might be the result of the different incentives that governments have in 
large, heterogeneous polities. And it could explain why, across European regions, the 
perception of the quality of public services is better in small regions, as we find in the 
second part of the empirical analysis..  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical hypotheses 
on why and how the size of a polity should affect governance. Section 3 provides the 
analysis of individual views on political representation in a sample of 42 countries. 
Section 4 looks at the effect of size on perceptions of quality of government using a novel 
dataset covering a sample of 117 regions in the European Union. Section 5 concludes. 
   
2. Theoretical expectations 
Some of the gains from size theorized in the literature (most notably, Alesina and 
Sploaore 2003) are related to the provision of some public goods (defense, a large market 
to sustain trade) are going to be assumed constant in what follows. These aspects are 
indeed crucial to understand historically the dynamics of the state, but we restrain our 
analysis to a time period and context (the current European Union) in which these two 
factors can be safely assumed to not vary greatly across countries or political units more 
broadly.  
 In these contexts, gains from size might derive from several and well known 
channels. First, there might be economies of scale (Alesina and Spolaore 2003), as the 
costs for providing certain public goods are irrespective of the number of users (Alesina 
and Wacziarg 1998). Second, a larger size implies government enjoys more diversified 
economic resources and more human resources (ceteris paribus, a larger pool of qualified 
would-be public employees). This mechanism may play a major role in explaining the 
positive effect of population size found in within-US studies regarding both local polities 
(Rice 2001) and states (Rice and Sumberg 1997, Knack 2002). These within-country 
studies acquire a special relevance in the literature on the impact of size because they 
control for country-specific factors and, in addition, the authors have included a number 
of variables aimed at capturing the effects of other variables not available at cross-
national level. These authors argue that, notwithstanding the potential indirect negative 
consequences that size might exert on governance as a result of greater diversity (see 
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below), it might have a direct positive impact, allegedly thanks to an increase of 
government capacity. 
On the other hand, the main drawbacks of large polities are related to the 
problems of organizing the democratic functioning of heterogeneous political units. 
Already Aristotle recognized that “it is difficult, if not impossible, for a populous state to 
be run by good laws” (quoted in Knack and Azfar 2003: 3). Alesina (2003) puts it 
simply: “as heterogeneity increases, more and more individuals or regions will be less 
satisfied”. Heterogeneity makes more complicated the decisions over how to provide 
public goods, since the way in which a public good is provided typically has 
distributional consequences. In the worst case, social, political, and economic 
heterogeneity (all of them are arguably related to the size of the polity), might lead to all 
sort of tensions and perhaps to outright intra-country conflicts. What is important to note 
is that all these arguments can be framed in terms of a structural deterioration of the 
quality of political representation: in large and thus heterogeneous polities, the link 
between political representatives and those represented is weakened, as their views and 
preferences are more likely to differ and enter in conflict. These concerns are at the root 
of the demand of greater decentralization and municipal democracy. Already in 1967, 
Dahl concluded that “as the optimum unit for democracy in the 21st Century, the city has 
a greater claim, I think, than any other alternative” (1967: 964).3 
A slightly different political mechanism that emphasizes the virtues of small 
communities is not directly linked to the degree of proximity between the representatives 
and the people, but with the ability of the latter to control effectively the former. More 
than classical Greece’s philosophers, the inspiration here comes from French modern 
ones. For Montesquieu (quoted in Olsson and Hansson 2011, 613), “in a small republic, 
the public good is more strongly felt, better known, and closer to each citizen”; and for 
Rousseau “all citizens know each other and keep an eye on each other” (ibid.). Small 
polities, in this view, facilitate the gathering and sharing of information among the public 
necessary to hold politicians accountable. In large political systems, sharing common 
views about the action of politicians is more difficult, as it is to coordinate actions among 
citizens to reward those leaders who act in the interest of the community and punish those 
                                                 
3
 For critical views on this idea, see Larsen (2002) and Newton (1982).  
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who do not. As a result, politicians should be expected to enjoy more slack in large 
polities, and their political incentives to deliver good public policies should decrease.  
The solid lines in Figure 1 represent how we should expect the size of the polity 
to affect the quality of democratic governance through these “standard” channels, well 
established in the literature. On the one hand, size should be expected to be associated 
with a deterioration of political representation, but on the other, governments in large 
polities enjoy greater opportunities to provide services to the public more effectively. As 
these two forces move in opposite directions, the overall effect of size on the quality of is 
thus indeterminate.  
Figure 1. Expected effects on size and quality of government 
 
The bottom part of the figure represents in dashed lines a third possible causal 
chain between size and the quality of governance also related to the effects that size has 
on the functioning of political representation. Large polities might not (only) have, but 
perhaps more importantly, may have publics with more divergent perceptions about how 
political representation works. The reason is relatively simple. Following the previous 
discussion about the problems that heterogeneity of preferences creates, in large polities 
it becomes more difficult to accommodate the demands of the whole public. If 
governments in large polities have difficulties in building overarching coalitions (because 
of the greater heterogeneity of preferences) and are tempted to favor small “minimum 
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winning coalitions” underpinned by the use of highly distributional policies to favor those 
in that coalition, it is possible that those individuals who fall into the “winning” coalition 
will feel very well represented by the political system while political “losers” will tend to 
feel alienated. The overall effect of size may or may not be a corrosion of the overall 
perception of representation: some groups will probably express disaffection towards the 
political system, but this might be outweighed by the fact that the “winners” will be very 
become more attached to it. In other words, the political “losers” – i.e. those citizens 
whose preferences are closest to the incumbents’ – will have more positive assessments 
of the way political representation works in small polities than in large ones, while the 
effect is the opposite for political “winners”. This third possibility thus suggests that size 
might be associated not necessarily with worse general perceptions over how political 
representation works, but with more divisive ones. The consequences of a more divisive 
public are likely to be harming for the quality of government, for several reasons. First, in 
these contexts, consensus is more difficult to reach, political conflicts are more likely to 
erupt, and public goods will be more difficult to be provided. But perhaps more 
importantly, the fact that heterogeneity is associated with government action geared 
towards distributional issues washes away one of the big advantages of open and 
democratic polities: the fact that policy competition leads to more efficient policy-making 
(Belsey 2001). All in all, size might be, via its impact on divisiveness, related to worse 
quality of government. 
In terms of the theoretical expectations outlined in Figure 1, our empirical 
strategy follows two steps. First, by looking at individual level data on perceptions of 
political representation in different contexts, we are able to test the hypotheses 
represented by the first and third arrow (whether size affects the perception of political 
representation and whether size affects the degree of heterogeneity on perceptions of 
political representation). Second, by looking at perceptions of quality of government in 
more than a hundred comparable political units (European regions), we are able to 
evaluate the validity of the relationship between size and quality of government (the two 
arrows represented in the right of the diagram). The next two sections conduct these two 
exercises, respectively.    
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3. Size and perceptions of the quality of political representation: A cross-country 
survey analysis. 
The first part of the empirical analysis exploits the second module of the Comparative 
Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) dataset
4
. This dataset compiles post-electoral national 
representative surveys administered in national-level elections from forty-two countries, 
in the time span from 2001 to 2007, and complements this individual-level data with 
macro-level variables both from the electoral district and from the country where the 
election took place. For our purposes, the second module is particularly useful to address 
the first set of empirical questions on the degree of perception of the quality of 
representation across polities, for two reasons. First, it is one of the few available datasets 
that incorporates information from a large cross-section of political systems, thus 
allowing us to investigate the effect of macro-level variables (namely, size) on the 
public’s perception about the quality of political representation in the polity. Second, the 
second module of the CSES was specifically designed to address questions about the 
nature of political representation, making it possible to see whether size matters 
differently to the various interpretations that quality of representation might have 
(ideological closeness to representatives, satisfaction with the way democracy works, 
perception about the degree of representativeness of political leaders, ability of elections 
to influence policy outcomes,…). 
More precisely, to assess the perception of the quality of political representation, we 
shall use seven different individual-level indicators from the CSES dataset: 
a) “satisfaction”, the degree of satisfaction with democracy (measured in a scale 
from 1 to 4)  
b) “vote matters”, the belief that votes in elections matters for what happens 
(measured in a scale from 1 to 5)  
c) “democracy good”, the degree of which the respondent agrees with the statement 
that democracy is the best form of government (in a 1 to 4 scale). 
d) “representation”, the belief that elections ensure that the views of voters are 
represented by parties (in a 1 to 4 scale).  
                                                 
4
 More details on the design of the questionnaires, the design of the compiled dataset, and the dataset itself 
can be found in www.cses.org 
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e) “party rep views”, the extent to which the respondent belief that there exists a 
political party that represents his or her views, 
f) “leader rep views”, the extent to which the respondent belief that there exist a 
leader that represents his or her views, 
g) “proximity”, the degree of ideological proximity between the individual and the 
government in a 0-10 scale.
5
        
Figures 2 and 3 plot the relationship between size (measured as the log of land size in 
square km in Figure 2, and as the log of the mid-year population in Figure 3) with the 
national averages of four of these indicators of quality of representation.
6
 At first glance, 
there seems to be no clear association between size and quality of political representation. 
Contrary to our expectation that smaller countries should have publics more satisfied with 
the functioning of representation in their political system, this preliminary evidence 
suggest no such systematic relationship exists. 
Figure 2. Land size and perceptions of quality of representation (CSES national means) 
  
                                                 
5
 As respondents are asked to place all relevant political parties in this 0-10 ideological scale, we can 
compute the government’s ideology as the average position of all parties in government, weighted by the 
proportion of portfolios held by party-affiliated ministers by each party. The use of this variable has forced 
us to limit the analysis to the thirty-seven elections for which this information on this variable was i) 
available, and ii) reliable.       
6
 The scatterplots for the remaining three indicators (not shown, available upon request) are equally 
inconclusive. 
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Figure 3. Population and perceptions of quality of representation (CSES national means)  
 
 
 
To evaluate more systematically the hypothesis that size matters for perceptions 
of representation, and given the nature of the data (individuals clustered in national 
surveys) we run a series of multi-level regressions with random intercepts for each 
national election survey of the following form:  
ijijjij eXR  0  
 
jj uSIZE 001000    
,where R refers to the indicator of political representation, and subscripts refer to 
individual i in election j. X is a vector of micro-level characteristics of the individual that 
might affect her views towards the political system through a vector of coefficients , and 
e is the error term). Because the size of the polity is a country-specific variable, we 
include this variable in the second-level equation.  
Tables 1 (including the log population as explanatory variable) and 2 (including 
size) present the first set of results, in which the dependent variables are the first four 
indicators of representation. All regressions include a battery of individual-level 
covariates that could affect the propensity to evaluate the political system differently 
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(age, sex, education, labor market position, and the fact of being approached by parties 
during the campaign, and the ideological proximity to the government)
7
. For each 
dependent variable we estimate two models, one in which size is the only second-level 
explanatory variable, and one in which we add macro-level controls too: an external 
indicator of quality of government (the widely used indicator from the International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG), Alesina’s measure of ethno--linguistic fractionalization, and 
two institutional dummies: whether the country has a federal constitutional structure, and 
whether the electoral system is proportional.
8
     
 
Some of these variables do exert systematic effects in perception of the quality of 
political representation in the expected direction, but the two measures of size, although 
signed in the expected direction, are almost always statistically insignificant. The only 
exception seems to the result for the notion that vote matters for outcomes. Publics living 
in highly populated countries tend to have a more pessimistic view about the ability of 
votes to influence the policy-making process.  
If instead of these indicators of political representation we take as dependent 
variable the belief that there is a party or a leader that represents the respondent’s views 
or the degree of ideological proximity of the respondent to the government, the results are 
unchanged.
9
 Regardless of the indicator used, there is no systematic relationship between 
size and the public’s average perception of the quality of political representation. The 
expectation of a negative sign in the first arrow of Figure 1 does not seem to be borne out 
by the evidence.  
Let us look at the alternative hypotheses suggested in the theoretical section. In 
large polities, as discussed before, the large heterogeneity of preferences might mean that 
system evaluations are largely driven by distributive, individual-specific characteristics. 
When preference heterogeneity is rampant, personal, divisive views about the 
government might exert a large influence on how do individuals evaluate the quality of  
                                                 
7
 The number of individual controls is limited for two reasons: first, the number of questions available in all 
surveys is not large, and second, and more importantly, we should not control for variables that could be 
interpreted as perceptions or evaluations of the political system, as long as these variables could be the 
mechanisms through which size matters for perceptions of representation.  
8
 All variables are taken from the Quality of Government time-variant dataset (http://www.qog.pol.gu.se/), 
and are measured for the year in which the survey was conducted in each country.  
9
 Results not reported, but available upon request) 
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Table 1. Effect of population size on perception of representation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 satisfaction satisfaction 
vote_matte
rs 
vote_matte
rs 
dem_good dem_good 
representat
ion 
representat
ion 
main         
logpop -0.019 -0.010 -0.078** -0.078* -0.028 -0.032 -0.0097 -0.0047 
 (0.033) (0.027) (0.031) (0.043) (0.027) (0.024) (0.019) (0.023) 
         
prox 0.0058** 0.0056** -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.00077 -0.0013 -0.0022 -0.0020 
 (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0023) (0.0024) 
         
unemployed -0.13*** -0.14*** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.081*** -0.083*** -0.026 -0.026 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.027) (0.027) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017) 
         
nonactive 0.0017 0.00099 -0.0029 -0.0027 -0.012 -0.013* 0.033*** 0.032*** 
 (0.0090) (0.0090) (0.015) (0.015) (0.0081) (0.0082) (0.0093) (0.0093) 
         
education 0.045*** 0.044*** 0.083*** 0.084*** 0.15*** 0.15*** -0.0054 -0.0053 
 (0.0059) (0.0059) (0.0096) (0.0096) (0.0054) (0.0054) (0.0060) (0.0061) 
         
age2 -0.000051 -0.00011 0.0012*** 0.0013*** 0.0027*** 0.0027*** -0.00052* -0.00053** 
 (0.00026) (0.00026) (0.00042) (0.00042) (0.00023) (0.00023) (0.00027) (0.00027) 
         
woman -0.022*** -0.021*** 0.017 0.015 -0.036*** -0.037*** 0.032*** 0.033*** 
 (0.0078) (0.0078) (0.013) (0.013) (0.0070) (0.0071) (0.0080) (0.0080) 
         
pol_part 0.017** 0.017*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.060*** 0.060*** 0.068*** 0.068*** 
 (0.0065) (0.0065) (0.011) (0.011) (0.0058) (0.0059) (0.0065) (0.0065) 
         
qog  1.25***  -0.36  0.68***  0.46* 
  (0.28)  (0.45)  (0.25)  (0.25) 
         
elf  -0.014  0.066  -0.16  -0.10 
  (0.16)  (0.26)  (0.15)  (0.14) 
         
proportional  -0.022  0.13  0.052  0.0052 
  (0.063)  (0.100)  (0.056)  (0.055) 
         
loggdppc  -0.0011  0.076  0.038  -0.027 
  (0.078)  (0.12)  (0.069)  (0.067) 
         
federal  0.18**  0.015  0.19***  0.072 
  (0.073)  (0.12)  (0.065)  (0.065) 
         
_cons 2.61*** 1.56** 4.53*** 3.94*** 3.15*** 2.25*** 2.54*** 2.40*** 
 (0.33) (0.63) (0.31) (0.99) (0.26) (0.57) (0.19) (0.55) 
sigma_u         
_cons 0.27*** 0.16*** 0.26*** 0.24*** 0.22*** 0.14*** 0.15*** 0.13*** 
 (0.033) (0.020) (0.032) (0.031) (0.027) (0.018) (0.019) (0.017) 
sigma_e         
_cons 0.73*** 0.73*** 1.20*** 1.20*** 0.66*** 0.66*** 0.71*** 0.71*** 
 (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0028) (0.0028) 
N 37132 36770 36889 36536 36871 36542 33170 32821 
chi2 158.9 200.6 618.2 628.4 1060.9 1086.3 147.2 155.6 
sigma_u 0.27 0.16 0.26 0.24 0.22 0.14 0.15 0.13 
sigma_e 0.73 0.73 1.20 1.20 0.66 0.66 0.71 0.71 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01   
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Table 2. Effect of land size on perception of representation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 satisfaction satisfaction 
vote_matte
rs 
vote_matte
rs 
dem_good dem_good 
representat
ion 
representat
ion 
main         
logsize 0.015 0.0077 -0.018 -0.037 0.016 -0.010 -0.0074 -0.011 
 (0.022) (0.019) (0.024) (0.031) (0.018) (0.018) (0.013) (0.016) 
         
prox 0.0075*** 0.0056** -0.025*** -0.027*** 0.0010 -0.0013 -0.0022 -0.0020 
 (0.0021) (0.0023) (0.0035) (0.0038) (0.0019) (0.0021) (0.0023) (0.0024) 
         
unemployed -0.13*** -0.14*** -0.11*** -0.12*** -0.079*** -0.083*** -0.026 -0.026 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.026) (0.027) (0.014) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017) 
         
nonactive 0.0068 0.0010 -0.0028 -0.0028 -0.0079 -0.013* 0.033*** 0.032*** 
 (0.0085) (0.0090) (0.014) (0.015) (0.0077) (0.0082) (0.0093) (0.0093) 
         
education 0.038*** 0.044*** 0.092*** 0.084*** 0.14*** 0.15*** -0.0053 -0.0054 
 (0.0056) (0.0059) (0.0092) (0.0096) (0.0051) (0.0054) (0.0060) (0.0061) 
         
age2 -0.000100 -0.00011 0.0011*** 0.0013*** 0.0029*** 0.0027*** -0.00052* -0.00053** 
 (0.00024) (0.00026) (0.00040) (0.00042) (0.00022) (0.00023) (0.00027) (0.00027) 
         
woman -0.020*** -0.021*** 0.0039 0.015 -0.036*** -0.037*** 0.032*** 0.033*** 
 (0.0073) (0.0078) (0.012) (0.013) (0.0067) (0.0071) (0.0080) (0.0080) 
         
pol_part 0.020*** 0.017*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.062*** 0.060*** 0.068*** 0.068*** 
 (0.0061) (0.0065) (0.010) (0.011) (0.0056) (0.0059) (0.0065) (0.0065) 
         
qog  1.28***  -0.050  0.79***  0.48** 
  (0.27)  (0.44)  (0.25)  (0.24) 
         
elf  -0.035  0.11  -0.15  -0.077 
  (0.17)  (0.27)  (0.15)  (0.15) 
         
proportional  -0.0098  0.18*  0.071  0.0020 
  (0.060)  (0.097)  (0.055)  (0.053) 
         
loggdppc  -0.0079  0.030  0.019  -0.030 
  (0.076)  (0.12)  (0.069)  (0.066) 
         
federal  0.15**  -0.029  0.17**  0.085 
  (0.071)  (0.12)  (0.065)  (0.063) 
         
_cons 2.24*** 1.42** 3.95*** 3.86*** 2.66*** 2.16*** 2.53*** 2.49*** 
 (0.27) (0.64) (0.30) (1.04) (0.23) (0.59) (0.17) (0.55) 
sigma_u         
_cons 0.27*** 0.16*** 0.29*** 0.25*** 0.22*** 0.14*** 0.15*** 0.13*** 
 (0.031) (0.020) (0.034) (0.032) (0.026) (0.018) (0.019) (0.017) 
sigma_e         
_cons 0.73*** 0.73*** 1.21*** 1.20*** 0.66*** 0.66*** 0.71*** 0.71*** 
 (0.0025) (0.0027) (0.0042) (0.0044) (0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0028) (0.0028) 
N 41616 36770 41422 36536 41232 36542 33170 32821 
chi2 160.9 200.6 671.4 626.7 1177.3 1084.8 147.2 155.9 
sigma_u 0.27 0.16 0.29 0.25 0.22 0.14 0.15 0.13 
sigma_e 0.73 0.73 1.21 1.20 0.66 0.66 0.71 0.71 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table 3. Conditional effects on size 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 satisfaction vote_matte dem_good representat satisfaction vote_matte dem_good representat
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rs ion rs ion 
main         
logpop -0.016 -0.059 -0.075** 0.00062     
 (0.025) (0.044) (0.027) (0.025)     
         
logsize     -0.046* -0.056 -0.058** -0.067*** 
     (0.019) (0.033) (0.020) (0.018) 
         
govt_ev 0.47*** 0.21*** 0.043 0.23*** 0.37*** -0.018 0.018 0.089* 
 (0.036) (0.062) (0.035) (0.038) (0.037) (0.064) (0.035) (0.037) 
         
prox -0.086*** -0.048 -0.088*** -0.019 -0.080*** -0.013 -0.080*** -0.052** 
 (0.016) (0.027) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015) (0.027) (0.015) (0.016) 
         
pop_ev -0.0078* -0.0096 0.0071* -0.00022     
 (0.0036) (0.0062) (0.0035) (0.0038)     
         
pop_prox 0.0096*** 0.0023 0.0090*** 0.0019     
 (0.0016) (0.0028) (0.0016) (0.0017)     
         
size_ev     0.0014 0.010* 0.0074** 0.011*** 
     (0.0029) (0.0050) (0.0028) (0.0029) 
         
size_prox     0.0070*** -0.0010 0.0063*** 0.0041** 
     (0.0012) (0.0021) (0.0012) (0.0012) 
         
ideology 0.022*** 0.014*** 0.020*** 0.012*** 0.020*** 0.012*** 0.018*** 0.012*** 
 (0.0017) (0.0029) (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0027) (0.0015) (0.0017) 
         
unemployed -0.11*** -0.097*** -0.078*** -0.0062 -0.11*** -0.096*** -0.079*** -0.0059 
 (0.016) (0.028) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.028) (0.016) (0.017) 
         
nonactive -0.0049 -0.016 -0.017* 0.026** -0.0043 -0.016 -0.016 0.027** 
 (0.0089) (0.015) (0.0085) (0.0095) (0.0089) (0.015) (0.0085) (0.0095) 
         
qog 0.93*** -0.45 0.65* 0.27 0.78** -0.15 0.60* 0.20 
 (0.26) (0.46) (0.29) (0.25) (0.26) (0.43) (0.27) (0.24) 
         
education 0.049*** 0.085*** 0.15*** -0.0080 0.049*** 0.085*** 0.15*** -0.0082 
 (0.0058) (0.0099) (0.0055) (0.0061) (0.0058) (0.0099) (0.0055) (0.0061) 
         
age2 0.0000087 0.0015*** 0.0028*** -0.00030 
-
0.0000002
1 
0.0015*** 0.0027*** -0.00031 
 (0.00025) (0.00044) (0.00024) (0.00027) (0.00025) (0.00044) (0.00024) (0.00027) 
         
woman -0.021** 0.029* -0.035*** 0.036*** -0.021** 0.028* -0.035*** 0.035*** 
 (0.0076) (0.013) (0.0073) (0.0081) (0.0076) (0.013) (0.0073) (0.0081) 
         
pol_part 0.022*** 0.21*** 0.061*** 0.067*** 0.023*** 0.21*** 0.061*** 0.068*** 
 (0.0063) (0.011) (0.0061) (0.0066) (0.0063) (0.011) (0.0061) (0.0066) 
         
proportional 0.042 0.17 0.091 0.053 0.0093 0.20* 0.084 0.028 
 (0.058) (0.10) (0.064) (0.056) (0.058) (0.097) (0.061) (0.055) 
         
loggdppc 0.022 0.070 0.014 -0.0044 0.045 0.031 0.018 0.011 
 (0.073) (0.12) (0.080) (0.070) (0.074) (0.12) (0.078) (0.069) 
         
_cons 0.58 3.52*** 2.58*** 1.61** 0.90 3.82*** 2.59*** 2.38*** 
 (0.60) (1.03) (0.66) (0.58) (0.64) (1.07) (0.67) (0.59) 
sigma_u         
_cons 0.14*** 0.25*** 0.16*** 0.13*** 0.15*** 0.25*** 0.16*** 0.14*** 
 (0.018) (0.032) (0.020) (0.018) (0.019) (0.033) (0.020) (0.018) 
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sigma_e         
_cons 0.68*** 1.18*** 0.66*** 0.68*** 0.68*** 1.18*** 0.66*** 0.68*** 
 (0.0026) (0.0046) (0.0025) (0.0028) (0.0026) (0.0046) (0.0025) (0.0028) 
N 33441 33488 33104 29545 33441 33488 33104 29545 
chi2 5212.9 737.4 1649.1 1800.9 5207.6 737.9 1646.2 1827.1 
sigma_u 0.14 0.25 0.16 0.13 0.15 0.25 0.16 0.14 
sigma_e 0.68 1.18 0.66 0.68 0.68 1.18 0.66 0.68 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
representation. Those who side with the government will have an overtly sanguine 
assessment of the quality of political representation, whereas those excluded will be  
much more critical of the system as a whole. In contrast, in small, homogeneous 
communities evaluations of the current government, or the proximity to the leaders of the 
country should be relatively more independent of the evaluation of the system as a whole, 
insofar as this preference homogeneity contributes to the diffuse support that the system 
enjoys. To test for that conjecture, Table 3 presents the results of a set of multi-level 
regressions similar to the ones presented before, but in which the effect of size 
(population in models (1) through (4), and land in models (5 through 8) is allowed to vary 
for different types of respondents, depending her evaluation of the current government 
and her ideological proximity towards it. 
The key parameters of interest here are the interaction terms, presented in rows 
(5) through (8). They indicate how the effects of government evaluations and ideological 
proximity on the perception of the quality of representation (measured in these four the 
change as the size of the country increases. In eight cases, the interaction term is positive 
and statistically significant, implying that, as expected, the political identity of the 
respondent is more closely associated with the evaluation of the political representation 
that the system provides in large polities than in small ones. 
To get a sense of the magnitude of some of these effects, Figure 4 plots the 
marginal effect of a one-unit increase in the evaluation of the government on the variable 
“representation” for different values of the log of land size, and Figure 5 plots the 
marginal effect of a one-unit increase in the ideological proximity indicator on the 
variable “satisfaction with democracy” for different values of the log of population. 
These conditional effects are statistically and substantially significant, and they show that 
while personal views about the government are little informative of the individual’s 
assessment of the quality of representation in small polities, in large ones these variables 
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are much more relevant. In other words, political “losers” tend to have more positive 
assessments of the way political representation works in small polities than in large ones, 
while the effect is the opposite for political “winners”. In line with hypotheses (2) above, 
these results suggests that perceptions about political representation are more driven by 
distributional, divisive concerns in large countries than in small ones.   
Figure 4. Marginal effect of Government Evaluations on perceptions of 
“representation”, for different values of land size. 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Marginal Effect of Ideological Proximity to Government on Satisfaction 
with Democracy, for different values of population. 
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Taking stock of these results, the size of the polity, either interpreted as 
geographical size or as the size of the population, does not appear to be directly related 
with better assessments of the quality of representation in democratic regimes, even after 
taking into consideration the effect of plausible individual and macro-level determinants 
of these assessments. However, this does not imply that size is completely irrelevant for 
the individuals’ views of political representation. In small polities, both in terms of land 
size and population, perceptions about the quality of political representation appear much 
less driven by the personal ideological views of individuals (the assessment they make of 
the current government and the degree of ideological proximity towards the government) 
than in large ones. What does this imply for quality of government? The next section tries 
to shed some light on this question. 
 
 4. Size and perceptions of the quality of accountability: Exploiting variation across 
European regions.  
 
Now we shift out attention to the comparison of perceptions of quality of the services 
provided by government. The previous analysis has found no clear relationship exists 
between size and overall perceptions of political representation. According to the 
standard theoretical expectations summarized by the solid lines in Figure 1, this suggests 
that polity size should be either positively related to quality of government (if there are 
gains from size in terms of government capacity), or unrelated to it (if no such 
relationship exists). However, according to the new hypothesis regarding the effect of 
size on political divisiveness (for which the preceding section has provided consistent 
evidence), the relationship between size and quality of government might well be 
negative, even if the political representation is unaffected by size. This section looks at 
these different possibilities, taking advantage of a rather unique dataset gathering 
information from more than a hundred political units. This datasets allows us to exploit 
the variation in the size of the polity not only at the national, but also at the sub-national 
level (Charron, Lapuente and Dykstra 2012).   
Due to the novelty of the data itself, we describe each variable one by one, with 
particular attention to the dependent variable. 
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The dependent variable 
With respect to data on ‘quality of government’ or corruption measures, national-
level data has proliferated in recent years, yet measuring QoG at the regional level within 
most countries is ‘uncharted territory’.  Several recent surveys have been launched by 
Transparency International in Mexico and India to build measurements of citizen 
perceptions of corruption at the regional level.  However, in most countries, in particular 
those in the Europe, such data do not exist and those that do are more narrowly focused 
on capturing corruption, mostly in Italy (Del Monte and Papagni 2007; Golden and Picci 
2005).   However, in a recent study funded by the European Commission for regional 
Development (REGIO), regional-level data was published based on a large survey of 
approximately 34,000 EU citizens.  Based on this, Charron, Lapuente and Rothstein 
(2011) constructed a regional-level QoG index score for 172 NUTS 1 and NUTS 2 
regions within 18 EU countries based on 16 survey questions on citizen perception of 
QoG in their area – the European Quality of Government Index (EQI).   
      In attempting to capture the most relevant sub-national variation in QoG possible, the 
authors of the data focused on three public services that are most often financed, 
administered or politically accounted for by sub-national authorities, either at regional, 
county or local level: education, health care and law enforcement.
10
 They asked 
respondents to rate these three public services with respect to three related concepts of 
QoG based on their perceptions and experiences – the quality, the impartiality and the 
level of corruption of said services.  While the authors provide the amalgamated index 
based on all 16 questions, they provide in addition the results of each survey question for 
all 172 regions.   
In this part of the analysis, using this novel data, we employ two dependent 
variables.  First, we test the effects of regional size on the overall EQI in general.  
Second, we take the results of the three questions regarding only the respondents’ 
responses to the ‘quality’ of their regional public sector11.  On a scale of ‘0-10’ (e.g. 
                                                 
10 The authors inquired the respondents’ recent contact with these three public services and found that a 60% and 78% 
had personal contact with education and health services respectively in the past 12 months, while about 25% of the total 
respondents had direct contact with law enforcement. The complete survey as well as the number of respondents per 
country and respondent experience with the three public services in question can be found in the appendix.  In total, 
each region had roughly 200 citizen respondents.   
 
11 The results of each question were standardized (with a EU sample mean of ‘0’,and standard deviation of ‘1’) 
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‘extremely poor’ to ‘excellent’), respondents were asked the following questions from the 
EQI data: 
1. ‘How would you rate the quality of public education in your area?’  
2. ‘How would you rate the quality of the public health care system in your 
area?’ 
3. ‘How would you rate the quality of the police force in your area?’ 
 
The mean responses of three questions are aggregated to the regional level and combined 
using equal weighting into one measure
12
 (QUALITY).   
 
Independent Variables 
The key independent variables in question relate to the size of each region.  To 
best capture size, we can draw from variations of two different measures, as in the 
previous analysis: the logged population, and the he size of a region in terms of area 
(squared kilometres, also logged).  The first measure is an average from 2007-2009 and 
the latter is from 2008. Both measures were taken from Eurostat and are available for all 
regions in the sample. Although one has to be cautious in interpreting what each 
dimension of size substantially mean in the light of the theoretical argument sketched 
before, it could be argued that population captures better the gains from a cheaper 
provision of public goods (and should be thus expected to lead to better evaluations of 
public policy), while area proxies better for the heterogeneity of preferences in the region 
(and should be thus expected to lead to worse evaluations).  
  We control for a number of variables. First, Charron et al (2012) provide 
empirical evidence that economic development and QoG measures are highly correlated 
at both the national and regional level in EU, thus we control for two different commonly 
used measures of ‘development’.  The first is GDP per capita (PPP in Euros, logged) and 
the second is the Human Development Index (HDI).  Next, we control for whether a 
region includes the country’s capital city or not (0/1).  Third, we control for the overall 
level of ‘social trust in a region, as measured by Tabellini (2010), which is taken from the 
World Value survey.  We expect that social trust and both measures of development will 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
12 It should be noted that the correlation between the factor weighted measure and the combined measure using equal 
weighting is 0.92, thus differences in the results are negligible. 
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be positively correlated with the dependent variables, while Charron et al (2012) provide 
evidence that citizens tend to rate capital regions lower in terms of QoG on average, thus 
we expect this variable to be negatively associated with the dependent variables.  Finally, 
we control for specific country-level effects that are unobserved in the model via country-
fixed effects (e.g. country dummies). 
 
Sample 
Our level of analysis is the NUTS 1 or NUTS 2 region in the European Union
13
.  
Based on the Schengen area agreement and the vast opportunities for both capital and 
labour mobility across the EU, we find the regional level among these countries to be 
highly relevant and an appropriate group to apply our tests.  One caveat to take into 
consideration with respect to the sample however is the aspect of administrative 
relevance, which is critical to our theory: that the area in question is more or less 
politically (or at least administratively) responsible for the policy areas on which citizen 
opinions of quality services are based.  In several of the countries – in particular, those 
that are federal or semi-federal – the political and administrative relevance is of course 
obvious.  Germany, Austria, Belgium, Spain and Italy all have provinces in which the 
regional parliaments are elected by the citizens of that area and have a good deal of 
policy control over a wide scope of public policy, thus all regions from these countries 
are included in the sample.  For politically centralized countries, we then ask whether the 
regional level available in the country is ‘politically or administratively relevant’ – e.g. 
does the region have elections or is this the primary sub-national administrative level of 
governance in the country in question to which the central government allocates 
administrative authority over policy areas like health care, education or law enforcement?    
We find that in two countries (Poland and Denmark) all regions available have 
both political and administrative relevance, and one (France) the regional level is 
administratively relevant in several policy areas, in particular education, in addition to 
having regional elections.  Furthermore, in the case of several other regions (Wales, 
                                                 
13
 Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics’ (NUTS) are three levels of statistical regions established by the EU.  
IN the Charron, Lapuente and Dykstra data, countries available at the NUTS 1 level are from Germany, U.K., Sweden, 
Hungary, Greece, Netherlands and Belgium.  NUTS 2 countries are Italy, Spain, Portugal, Denmark, Czech Republic, 
Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, France, and Austria. 
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Scotland and Northern Ireland in the U.K.) such regions are politically and 
administratively relevant yet other regions in this country available in the data are not, 
thus all other UK regions are dropped.  Other countries in the data, such as Romania, 
Sweden, Portugal or Bulgaria either have no region that is relevant enough to include or 
have data available that does not match the most relevant sub-national level in that 
country and are thus not included here.  In total, we include 117 regions from nine 
different EU countries.  The sample is summarized in Table 4.  
 
Table 4: Summary of the European Regional Sample 
    
Countries with all regions included  
Germany (16)   
Austria (9)   
Spain (16)   
Belgium (3)   
Poland (16)   
Italy (21)    
Denmark (5)   
France (26)   
    
Countries with some regions included 
United Kingdom (3)   
        
note: number of regions in parentheses.  
 
Results  
OLS results are presented in Table 5. We begin by employing a parsimonious 
specification in model 1, without country fixed-effects.  We first test the impact of size, 
along with PPP per capita (logged), controlling for capital regions.  We find that when 
testing the effects of size in a EU-wide sample, neither population nor area significantly 
explains variation in the EQI.  Yet we see that the impact of both variables is significant 
at the 95% level of confidence in model 2 when controlling for country fixed-effects.  
This is a rather intuitive result however; as both higher-QoG countries (like Denmark or 
Austria) and lower-QoG countries (like Poland or Italy) have relatively large/populous 
regions as well as more rural or smaller ones, thus ‘cancelling each other out’ if fixed 
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effects are not controlled for.  Therefore when we focus on the differences in regional 
size within states with fixed-effects, we find two fairly consistent and robust 
relationships.  First, in all models 2-5 we find that population (logged) is negatively 
associated with the EQI or perception of public service quality (in model 5).  However, 
on the other hand, regions that are larger in area tend, on average, to have a higher EQI or 
Quality score, even when controlling for development, capital region and social trust.  
We find that in all five models, our indicator of regional development (PPP or HDI) is 
strongly correlated with the dependent variables, while capital regions are always 
negatively associated with the EQI or Quality, yet only statistically significant in models 
3 and 5.  Interestingly, ‘social trust’ – which obviously reduces the sample size 
substantially, is not significantly related to the EQI, while both measures of size as well 
as PPP per capita (logged) are strongly significant in model 4.   
All models, in particular those with country dummy variables, explain a high degree of 
variation in the dependent variables according to the R² (between 74% and 84% of the 
total variation). Finally, it should be noted that when testing the effects of HDI or social 
trust on the Quality dependent variable, the results follow the same pattern as models 3 
and 4.   
What do these results indicate in relation to the theoretical expectations outlined 
before? According to the standard account, it seems puzzling that, given that size has no 
effect on the quality of political representation –the main channel through which size has 
been argued to be harmful for democratic governance-, large polities (in terms of area) do 
tend to have publics with worse evaluations of public policies. These results are in line 
with some previous studies (Mouritzen 1989) and, more importantly, with the alternative 
hypothesis, namely that a large and heterogeneous polity (arguably better captured by 
land size rather than population) produces more divisive publics, which in turn has 
deleterious consequences for the provision of public policies. On the other hand, the 
results for population are more in line with the standard account. In more populated 
polities, public evaluations of public policies are significantly better, perhaps as a result 
of governments seizing the gains from size described before.  
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Table 5. Polity Size and Quality Public of Institutions at the Regional Level 
  1. EQI 2. EQI 3. EQI 4. EQI 5. Quality 
Population (log) -3.11 -4.49** -4.95** -7.47*** -0.21** 
 (0.12) (0.03) (0.01) (0.002) (0.04) 
Area (log) 2.25 3.14** 1.71 5.66*** 0.13** 
 (0.17) (0.04) (0.14) (0.009) (0.05) 
Capital Region -7.12 -7.25 -6.99** -15.23** -0.50** 
 (0.34) (0.15) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) 
PPP p.c. (log) 26.03** 26.82***  36.36*** 1.42*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
HDI   0.77***   
   (0.000)   
Social Trust    0.19  
    (0.43)  
Austria  10.43* 9.05**  0.80** 
  (0.08) (0.03)  (0.02) 
Belgium  -2.81 -4.39 1.73 1.42 
  (0.73) (0.52) (0.80) (0.14) 
Denmark  14.95*** 20.63***  1.63*** 
  (0.001) (0.000)  (0.000) 
Germany  16.23*** 12.40*** 11.12** 0.78*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.03) (0.000) 
France  0.72 0.02  0.76*** 
  (0.78) (0.98)  (0.18) 
Italy  -21.60*** -16.35*** -21.76*** 1.08*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Poland  5.90 -1.24  1.55*** 
  (0.43) (0.83)  (0.000) 
U.K.  14.39*** 8.12** 11.77** 1.79*** 
  (0.000) (0.04) (0.002) (0.000) 
      
Constant -171.25*** -168.94*** 74.04*** -18.18*** -13.18*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Rsq.  0.41 0.82 0.84 0.81 0.74 
N 116 116 112 54 116 
Countries 9 9 9 5 9 
note: OLS regression with robust standard errors (p-values in parentheses).   
Dependent variable in models 1-4 is the EQI (0 ~100) and ‘Elections’ in model 5 (-2.47 ~ 2.27) 
In models 2-5, controlling for country fixed effects, Spain is the comparison group.  In model 4, the 
sample size is reduced because ‘Social Trust’ is only available for region in 5 countries – UK, Spain, 
Italy, Germany and Belgium. 
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.10     
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5. Conclusions  
This paper has explored how differences in the size of the polity affects citizens 
perceptions of political representation and the quality of services provided by their 
governments. To address this question, we have used two different sources of data: first, 
we explore individual-level variation in perceptions of political representation living in 
polities of different size. We find that, contrary to conventional wisdom, citizens living in 
large polities do not hold worse views on average about the way in which political 
representation works in their country. However, we do find that perceptions about 
political representation are more divided in large polities than in small ones. Everywhere, 
those who are ideologically close the government tend to express very good positive 
views about political representation, while those that are distant from it are more skeptic 
towards the ability of the system to represent their views. But the difference in 
perceptions between these two groups is markedly larger in large polities. Put differently, 
large polities have more divisive publics.  
The second dataset explores differences in perceptions of the provision of public 
services across a very large cross-section of comparable political units of different size: 
125 European regions. If, as the previous results indicate, size does not have 
consequences on the overall perception of political representation, one should expect size 
to have unambiguously positive effects on the quality of services, provided that 
governments in large polities exploit the advantages of size in the provision of public 
services. However, we find the opposite. In large polities (in terms of land area), publics 
evaluate worse the public services that they receive. We can only speculate here, but one 
possible cause of this result is the fact that the divisiveness in terms of representation 
associated with size makes it effective policy-making more difficult.  
Overall, these findings indicate that the effects of size on political representation 
and quality of government might be slightly different from what the standard literature 
suggests. The evidence in support of the idea that people in large polities become more 
alienated from the political process, or that the provision of public goods is improved as 
the size of the political unit increases is very weak. However, size might have one big 
political consequence: it provides incentives to politicians to behave differently. In large 
polities, faced with a greater heterogeneity of preferences, policy-makers are more eager 
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to target policies to please the demands of particular groups, and less so to provide 
universal public goods. Our two main empirical results are consistent with this simple 
conjecture. First, in large polities people’s views about representation are significantly 
more driven by how well the political systems treats them particularly. And second, 
people in small polities tend to evaluate better the provision of public services. Further 
research, both theoretical and empirical, will be needed to shed more light on the validity 
and limitations of this hypothesis.   
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Appendix 1: description of Sub-National survey and data construction 
The EU regional survey was undertaken between 15, December, 2009 and 1 February, 
2010 by Efficience 3, a French market-research, survey company.  The respondents, 
ranging from 18 years of age or older, were contacted randomly via telephone in the local 
language by the ‘birthday method’ with replacement.  As Longstreth, and Shields (2009) 
find, although not as demographically representative as the ‘quota method’, the birthday 
method obtains a reasonably representative sample of the population while providing a 
better distribution of opinion. 
         In trying to capture any regional variation within a country, we asked 34 QoG and 
demographic based questions to the approximately 200 respondents per NUTS region.  
Regarding the QoG questions, the respondents were asked about three general public 
services in their regions – education, health care and law enforcement.  Publically 
administered areas such as immigration, customs or national security were intentionally 
avoided because these are dealt with at the national or even supranational level.  In 
focusing on these three services, we asked respondents to rate their public services with 
respect to three related concepts of QoG – the quality, impartiality and level of 
corruption of said services
 14
.  In addition we included two further questions in the index 
– one about the fairness of regional elections and the other about the strength and 
effectiveness of the media in the region to expose corruption.   
        In constructing the regional level data, we followed the advice of the “Handbook on 
Constructing Composite Indicators” (2008) from the OECD and JRC.  After many 
internal consistency checks and tests at both the individual and aggregate regional levels, 
we ran correlations and factor analysis and determined 16 of the survey questions on 
QoG would be used to build the regional QoG index.  For the sake of simplicity and 
easier replication, we first standardize each question
15
 and aggregated the individual-level 
responses to the regional level, taking the simple mean.  To combine the 16 questions 
into one index for each region, we used equal weighting and arithmetic aggregation.  We 
standardize the data so that the mean is ‘0’ with a standard deviation of ‘1’.   
 
  
                                                 
14
 These are related concepts which have come up frequently in the comparative QoG literature, thus we try 
to include citizens’ opinion regarding all three, for more, see Holmberg, Rothstein and Nasturosi (2009).   
15
 Questions are standardized due variations in the range of response (i.e. ‘0-10’, ‘0-4’, ‘yes/no’, etc.) 
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Survey Questions Incorporated in the Regional QoG Index 
Rule of Law-Focused Questions     
"How would you rate the quality of the police force in your area?" (low/high, 0-10)   
“The police force gives special advantages to certain people in my area.” (agree/disagree, 0-10)  
“All citizens are treated equally by the police force in my area”  (Agree, rather agree, rather disagree or Disagree, 1-4) 
“Corruption is prevalent in the police force in my area” (agree/disagree, 0-10)   
       
Government Effectiveness-focused questions     
"How would you rate the quality of public education in your area?" (low/high 0-10)   
"How would you rate the quality of the public health care system in your area?" (low/high 0-10)  
“Certain people are given special advantages in the public education system in my area (agree/disagree, 0-10) 
“Certain people are given special advantages in the public health care system in my area.” (agree/disagree, 0-10) 
“All citizens are treated equally in the public education system in my area” .” (Agree, rather agree, rather disagree or Disagree, 1-4) 
“All citizens are treated equally in the public health care system in my area” .” (Agree, rather agree, rather disagree or Disagree, 1-4) 
       
Voice & Accountability-focused questions     
"In your opinion, if corruption by a public employee or politician were to occur in your area,  
how likely is it that such corruption would be exposed by the local mass media?" (unlikely/likely,  0-10) 
"Please respond to the following: Elections in my area are honest and clean from corruption" (agree/disagree, 0-10) 
       
Corruption-Focused Questions     
“Corruption is prevalent in my area’s local public school system (agree/disagree, 0-10)  
“Corruption is prevalent in the public health care system in my area” (agree/disagree, 0-10)  
"In the past 12 months have you or anyone living in your household paid a bribe in any form to:  
Health or medical services?" (yes/no)     
"In your opinion, how often do you think other citizens in your area use bribery to obtain public services?" (never/very often, 0-10) 
 
 
 
